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THE FATE OF THE SOUL IN ANCIENT ‘CONSOLATIONS’ 
RHETORICAL HANDBOOKS AND THE WRITERS* 
 
Ancient consolatory literature has always placed scholars before the pro-
blem of the precise classification of this genre, which appears to occupy a 
middle position between rhetoric (more specifically epideictic oratory) and 
philosophy. Accordingly, scholars are divided as to whether the latter or the 
former – philosophy or rhetoric – was the stronger influence in this type of 
writing. Roughly, each one of these two positions may be identified by the 
name of two German scholars, the authors of two influential books on the 
subject: Rudolf Kassel and Horst-Theodor Johann respectively1. Kassel ad-
vocated the pre-eminence of rhetoric, Johann of philosophy. Of course, I 
would like to make it clear from the outset that I’m referring to consolation 
for the death of a beloved person, though there were consolatory speeches 
for several other occasions: for example, for somebody’s exile, like Seneca’s 
consolation to his mother Helvia, for somebody’s absence, like Porphyry’s 
letter to his wife Marcella, and so forth.  
Now, there surely are formal statements by ancient authors which testify 
to the inclusion of the consolatio, lovgo" paramuqhtikov" in Greek, as an in-
tegral part of philosophical literature. Seneca, in two of his letters, tells us 
that it was a customary element of the ethical part of philosophy, at least 
since Posidonius2. However, undervaluing the rhetorical factor would make 
us lose sight not merely of the strong influence of rhetoric at a later time, 
when the consolatio became a standard rhetorical theme and was regulated by 
 
* This paper was read on July 15, 2005 at the 15th Biennial Congress of the International 
Society for the History of Rhetoric held at the University of Southern California in Los 
Angeles. 
1 R. Kassel, Untersuchungen zur griechischen und römischen Literatur, München 1958; 
H.-Th. Johann, Trauer und Trost. Eine quellen- und strukturanalytische Untersuchung der 
philosophischen Trostschriften über den Tod, München 1968. For the rest of the copious 
literature I refer the reader to four previous papers of mine: A. Setaioli, Seneca e 
l’oltretomba, “Paideia” 52, 1997, 321-367 (now collected in Id. Facundus Seneca. Aspetti 
della lingua e dell’ideologia senecana, Bologna 2000, 275-323); Id., La vicenda dell’anima 
nella Consolatio di Cicerone, “Paideia” 54, 1999, 145-174; Id. El destino del alma en el 
pensamiento de Cicerón (con una apostilla sobre las huellas ciceronianas en Dante), 
“Anuario Filosófico” 34, 2001, 487-526; Id., Il destino dell’anima nella letteratura conso-
latoria pagana, in C. Alonso del Real (ed.), Consolatio. Nueve estudios, Pamplona 2001, 31-
67. 
2 Sen. ep.  94.21, 39, 49; 95.34. The reference to Posidonius is at ep. 95.65. See the 
discussion in A. Setaioli, Seneca e i Greci. Citazioni e traduzioni nelle opere filosofiche, 
Bologna 1988, 336-349. 
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rhetorical handbooks, but even of its very origin. This origin goes back to 
the Sophists (a Tevcnh ajlupiva", literally “Art of not grieving” was attributed 
to Antiphon, V century B.C.), and, later, consolation became a stock topic in 
the lovgoi ejpitavfioi, the speeches held to commemorate the dead, one of the 
forms of epideictic oratory. We have some of these speeches, written by 
some of the great Athenian orators, such as Lysias and Hyperides, as well as 
one attributed to Demosthenes; and Plato’s Menexenos is of course another 
specimen of this genre. All of these speeches duly contain consolatory parts. 
One of the handbooks I was referring to, the Tevcnh rJhtorikhv attributed 
to Dionysius of Halicarnassos (to which from now on I’ll refer to as Ps. 
Dionysius), treats consolatory speech precisely in the framework of the 
lovgo" ejpitavfio"3, but shows nevertheless clear similarities not only with 
what Menander of Laodicea, the author of another such handbook, the Peri; 
ejpideiktikw`n, wrote on the lovgo" ejpitavfio"4, but also with Menander’s 
autonomous treatment of consolation, the paramuqhtiko;" lovgo", as a self-
standing genre5. This proves the continuity between that particular branch of 
the old epideictic oratory (the lovgo" ejpitavfio") and the later self-standing 
consolations, whose model and fountainhead was commonly considered in 
antiquity to be the lost Peri; pevnqou" by the Academic philosopher Crantor 
(IV-III century B.C.). Though both these handbooks date from the III cen-
tury A.D., both reflect an established literary situation, going back at least to 
Alexandrian times. 
In writings of the latter type, the self-standing consolations, the philo-
sophical element could no doubt attain a considerable importance, when the 
author was a philosopher and used this vehicle to convey his own ideas. 
Nonetheless the very function of consolatory writings, which aimed to 
soothe the grief of the addressee, gave this practical goal the upper hand 
over theoretical and philosophical consistency. What we can say for sure is 
that even in consolatory works written by philosophers – in Seneca’s Conso-
lationes, for example – we find the same topoi as in the other writings of this 
type that have come down to us. 
Our special topic, the fate of the soul after death, could hardly be ignored 
in writings which aimed to soothe the grief caused by the death of a beloved 
person, but it could be treated in a variety of ways. According to Ps. Diony-
sius, the public lovgo" ejpitavfio", that is the speech in commemoration of the 
dead of a whole community, especially in war, should not be concerned with 
the survival of the individual soul: the immortality of the glory of the dead is 
 
3 Ps. Dionys.  ars rhet. 6.4-6 (II, pp. 281.1–283.19 Usener-Radermacher) 
4 Men. rhet. III, pp. 418.5–422.4 Spengel. 
5 Men. rhet. III, pp. 413.15–414.30 Spengel.   
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the only one that matters6. This rule is in fact based on the actual lovgoi 
ejpitavfioi that have come down to us. I may refer to the analysis of such 
writings by Gorgias, Lysias, Hyperides and Ps. Demosthenes I have con-
ducted elsewhere7. But when it comes to the private lovgo" ejpitavfio", the 
one commemorating a single member of a single family, Ps. Dionysius en-
joins to present the immortality of the individual soul as self-understood8. 
Needless to say, the private lovgo" ejpitavfio" was the only such type of 
speech still vital under the empire, when the body politic was totally subject-
ed to one supreme authority. Not surprisingly, we find the same recommen-
dation in Menander’s handbook, both in his independent treatment of conso-
latory speech9 and in the pages he devotes to the private lovgo" ejpitavfio"10. 
It may be of interest to stress the fact that in the latter context Menander ad-
vises the writers to describe the immortality of the departed either according 
to traditional mythology or in agreement with more up-to-date philosophical 
and religious ideas: the dead person may indifferently be depicted as either 
inhabiting the Elysian fields or partaking of the life of the gods11. However, 
while treating the consolation (paramuqhtiko;" lovgo") as a self-standing 
genre, he does show his preference: after mentioning an eternal life in the 
Elysian fields with the heroes of myth, he continues: “or rather the dead per-
son lives with the gods, wanders about the aether and observes the events of 
our world”12: a picture strongly reminiscent of the eschatological ending of a 
famous consolation: the Consolatio ad Marciam by Seneca. On his part, Ps. 
Dionysius adopts the Platonic idea of death as a liberation of the soul from 
the prison of the body13. As can easily be seen, a curious intertwining of 
rhetorical and philosophical elements had taken place. Of course in the rhe-
torical handbooks the latter had been completely severed from the theoretical 
ground from which they had originally stemmed. Doctrinal consistency was 
completely given up for the sake of rhetorical effect. Ps. Dionysius does re-
commend, as we said, to mention the Platonic doctrine of the body as prison 
of the soul, but only in the case of someone who died young, when it could 
be rhetorically used to emphasize the fact that the dead had been lucky to 
 
6 Ps. Dionys. ars rhet. 6.4 (II, p. 281.19) ajqavnato" aujtw`n hJ dovxa. 
7 Setaioli, Il destino dell’anima nella letteratura consolatoria pagana, 33-35. 
8 Ps. Dionys. ars rhet. 6.5, II, p. 283.7-9. 
9 Men. rhet. III, p. 414.16-20. 
10 Men. rhet. III, p. 421.14-17. 
11 Men. rhet. III, p. 421.16-17 politeuvetai ga;r meta; tw`n qew`n, h] to;  jHluvsion e[cei 
pedivon.  
12 Men. rhet. III, p. 414.19-20 kai; tavca pou ma`llon meta; tw`n qew`n diaita`tai nu`n, peri-
polei` to;n aijqevra kai; ejpiskopei` ta; th`/de. 
13 Ps. Dionys. ars rhet. 6.5, p. 282.10-14. 
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have been so soon delivered14. Though he does refer expressly to Plato, he 
considers him only as a model of style, not as a doctrinal source15. Menan-
der, though he enjoins to stress the divine origin of the soul (a topos 
commonly found in consolations), in order to present death as a return to its 
divine source, also suggests to present life either as a good or as an evil, de-
pending on rhetorical opportunity16. As we shall see, the fragments of Ci-
cero’s Consolatio to himself for the death of his daughter Tullia afford us a 
glimpse of such a mix of philosophical and rhetorical elements, whose ideo-
logical inconsistency does not impair the author’s sincerity and effectiveness. 
We could perhaps get a better idea about the import and the very existence 
of a difference between ‘rhetorical’ and ‘philosophical’ consolations, as far 
as the fate of the soul after death is concerned, if we possessed the complete 
text of the writing that was considered to be the model and fountainhead of 
the consolatory genre: the already mentioned Peri; pevnqou" by Crantor. 
Some scholars have taken it for granted that in this work Crantor discussed  
the immortality of the soul in the framework of what is conventionally called 
“the Socratic alternative”, after a famous passage in Plato’s Apology, in 
which Socrates poses the question whether death should be considered as the 
total annihilation of man or as a passage to a new (and better) life17: another 
typical topos of the consolatory genre. Since 1984, however, we possess a 
reliable edition of the fragments of the Peri; pevnqou", by Hans Joachim 
Mette18, and it has become impossible, as was usually done before, to con-
sider the Consolation to Apollonios attributed to Plutarch, which does indeed 
quote Crantor several times, as a more or less faithful transcription of the 
latter’s lost work, thereby attributing to Crantor just about all the ideas ex-
pressed in that pseudo-plutarchean work19. We have no time to go into more 
detail; for this I must refer to a paper of mine20; what we can and must stress 
now is the fact that, though it is by no means impossible or even unlikely 
that Crantor did discuss the immortality of the soul in the Peri; pevnqou", the 
 
14 Ps. Dionys. ars rhet. 6.5, II, p. 282.6-18. 
15 Ps. Dionys. ars rhet. 6.6, p. 283.17-19 ejn de; toi`" ejndovxoi" kai; mevgeqo" e[cousin, oi|on 
o{sa peri; yuch`", dihrmevnh ªhJ ajpaggelivaº kai; mevgeqo" e[cousa kai; ejggu;" baivnousa th/`' tou` 
Plavtwno".  
16 Men. rhet. III, p. 414.12-15.  
17 Plat. apol. 40C  duoi`n ga;r qavterovn ejsti to; teqnavnai: h] ga;r oi|on mhde;n ei\nai mhde; 
ai[sqhsin mhdemivan e[cein to;n teqnew`ta, h] kata; ta; legovmena metabolhv ti" tugcavnei ou\sa 
kai; metoivkhsi" eij" a[llon tovpon. 
18 H. J. Mette, Zwei Akademiker heute: Krantor von Soloi und Arkesilaos von Pitane, 
“Lustrum” 26, 1984, 7-94. 
19 See Setaioli, La vicenda dell’anima nella Consolatio di Cicerone, 146-147. 
20 Setaioli, La vicenda dell’anima nella Consolatio di Cicerone, 151-152. 
 THE FATE OF THE SOUL IN ANCIENT CONSOLATIONS 257 
extant fragments do not permit us to affirm it for sure.  
An idea that certainly appeared in the Peri; pevnqou" was that our life in 
this world is a punishment and a pain for the soul21. Again, several scholars 
have surmised that this old idea (going back at least to the Pythagorean phi-
losopher Philolaus), was expressed by Crantor in the frame of the doctrine of 
the cycle of the soul including incarnation, liberation from the body, rein-
carnation etc., which of course entails the immortality of the soul. Again, 
this is by no means impossible; but once more we must repeat that the extant 
fragments do not permit us to say that this was indeed the case. Rather, we 
should stress that the idea of life as punishment was a topos of consolatory 
writings, which appears several times elsewhere with no connection with 
reincarnation or the Platonic cycle of the soul; it is found, for instance, in 
Seneca’s two consolations for a death, the Consolatio ad Polybium22, and the 
Consolatio ad Marciam23, where the conception of the fate of the soul is 
very different and does not include reincarnation. Also, in Cicero’s 
Consolatio, which, by his own admission, followed Crantor24, the idea of life 
as a punishment did figure prominently, being repeated twice25, but Lac-
tantius, the Christian writer who reports the two fragments, clearly states that 
it was not connected with the doctrine of reincarnation, without which, as 
the Christian writer realizes, it was philosophically meaningless26. Clearly, 
the idea of life as a punishment had been detached from its philosophical 
 
21 Consol. ad Apoll. 27, 115B = Crantor F 6a Mette polloi`" ga;r kai; sofoi`" ajndravsin, 
w{" fhsi Kravntwr, ouj nu`n, ajlla; pavlai, kevklaustai tajnqrwvpina timwrivan hJgoumevnoi" 
ei\nai to;n bivon kai; ajrch;n to; genevsqai a[nqrwpon sumfora`" th`" megivsth".  
22 Sen. ad Polyb. 9.6 Si velis credere altius veritatem intuentibus, omnis vita supplicium 
est... in hoc tam procelloso et ad omnes tempestates exposito mari navigantibus nullus portus 
nisi mortis est.   
23 Sen. ad Marc. 22.3 Nihil est tam fallax quam vita humana, nihil tam insidiosum: non 
mehercules quisquam illam accepisset, nisi daretur ignorantibus. Itaque si felicissimum est 
non nasci, proximum est, puto, brevi aetate defunctos cito in integrum restitui. 
24 Cic. consol. F 4 Vitelli = Plin. NH  praef. 22 Crantorem sequor. 
25 Lact. inst. 3.18.18 cum in principio consolationis suae dixisset luendorum scelerum 
causa nasci homines (Cic. consol. F 1 Vitelli), iteravit id ipsum postea quasi obiurgans eum 
qui vitam non esse poenam putet (Cic. consol. F 7 Vitelli). 
26 Lact. inst. 3.18.14-18 quae ignorantia effecit ut quosdam dicere non puderet idcirco 
nos esse natos, ut scelerum poenas lueremus: quo quid delirius dici possit non invenio. Ubi 
enim vel quae scelera potuimus admittere qui omnino non fuimus? nisi forte credemus inepto 
illi seni, qui se in priore vita Euphorbum fuisse mentitus est... O miram et singularem 
Pythagorae memoriam et o miseram oblivionem nostrum omnium, qui nesciamus qui ante 
fuerimus!... Sed deridenda hominis levissimi vanitas. Quid Cicerone faciemus? qui cum in 
principio Consolationis suae dixisset luendorum scelerum causa nasci homines, iteravit id 
ipsum postea quasi obiurgans eum qui vitam non esse poenam putet. Recte ergo praefatus est 
errore ac miserabili veritatis ignorantia se teneri. 
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background and was used in consolatory writings to develop the consolatory 
topos of the lamentatio vitae, the “lament over life”, or “disparagement of 
life”, intended to diminish the grief caused by the death of a loved one by 
stressing the painfulness of life in this world. There is no way to know if this 
was the case in the Peri; pevnqou". But if Crantor, after stating that life is a 
punishment, left in the background the theme of immortality, he avoided a 
blatant philosophical inconsistency that Cicero – as we shall see – ran into. 
For now let us remark that elsewhere (in a fragment of his lost dialogue 
Hortensius) Cicero does correctly link the idea of life as a punishment to 
faults committed in another life, that is, to reincarnation27, contrary to what 
he did in the Consolatio. 
In consolatory writings both cases considered by what we called “the 
Socratic alternative” could be used for consolation; the writer could 
maintain that death is not an evil in either case, whether it delivers man from 
the pains of this life by annihilation or it entails the passage to a new and 
better life. For this reason it is wrong to blame Seneca as inconsequent, 
when he has recourse to both hypotheses in his consolations, as I have 
shown elsewhere28. Seneca was not concerned, in these writings, with 
establishing philosophical truths, but with attaining the rhetorical goal of 
affecting the addressees’ souls.  
 In very few cases authors of consolatory writings expressly refuse one of 
the two possibilities. On the one hand Plutarch, in his Consolatio ad uxorem  
considers only the case of a new life after death; but he had been initiated in 
the mysteries of Dionysus, a cult which preached the immortality of the 
soul. On the other hand, we may safely surmise that the Epicureans refused 
immortality, because of their philosophical convictions. We have fragments 
of a consolation that the Epicurean philosopher Metrodorus wrote for his 
sister when her son died, which make no mention of survival after death. As 
for Cicero, though in some consolatory letters addressed to people who had 
lost somebody they loved he does not mention an afterlife at all29, in others 
he states the Socratic alternative, with no attempt to solve it in a way or an-
other30. In reality, during all his life, Cicero never bothered to solve Socra-
tes’ dilemma, though he sometimes declares to be emotionally closer to the 
idea of immortality. Elsewhere I have investigated Cicero’s attitude on the 
 
27 Cic. Hortens. F 112 Grilli nos ob aliqua scelera suscepta in vita superiore poenarum 
luendarum causa natos esse.   
28 Setaioli, Seneca e l’oltretomba. 
29 Cic. fam. 4.6; ad Brut. 1.9. 
30 Cic. fam. 5.16.4; 4.5.6 (a letter by Servius Sulpicius Rufus to Cicero). 
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problem31. Here I’ll only mention that even his text where the immortality of 
the soul seems to be unquestionably accepted, namely the Somnium Scipio-
nis, is later demoted by Cicero himself to the simple, however brilliant, liter-
ary statement of one of the hyptheses of the Socratic alternative, not in any 
way being its solution. He does so in a quotation of the “Dream of Scipio” 
found in a work written about ten years later, the Laelius de amicitia32.  
Cicero repeats the Socratic alternative in several works: death is either 
the end of everything or the passage to a better life; in these texts punish-
ment after death is expressly ruled out33. Things are quite different in his 
Consolatio, whose fragments are now conveniently collected in the edition 
of Claudio Vitelli34. In fragment 22 Cicero decidedly states the immortality 
of the soul and says that after death it can receive either a reward or a 
punishment35. As far as we can see, the Consolatio is Cicero’s only work 
where the immortality of the soul is stated with no reservation. This is 
largely due, of course, to the human factor: the bereaved father can only be 
soothed by envisaging his departed daughter as eternally blissful, actually, 
as we shall see, deified. But we have also seen that the rhetorical handbooks 
recommended to present immortality as a certainty in consolatory writings. 
We have said that for this purpose they borrowed philosophical ideas 
 
31 Setaioli, El destino del alma en el pensamiento de Cicerón... 
32 Cic. Lael. 14 cuius (Scipionis) disputationis fuit extremum de immortalitate animorum, 
quae se in quiete per visum ex Africano audisse dicebat. Id si ita est, ut optimi cuiusque 
animus in morte facillime evolet tamquam e custodia vinclisque corporis, cui censemus 
cursum ad deos faciliorem fuisse quam Scipioni? quocirca maerere eius eventu vereor ne 
invidi magis quam amici sit. Si autem illa veriora, ut idem interitus sit animorum et corporum 
nec ullus sensus maneat, ut nihil boni est in morte, sic certe nihil mali; sensu enim amisso fit 
idem, quasi natus non esset omnino. 
33 Cic. Cato m. 66-67 (mors) aut plane neglegenda est, si omnino extinguit animum, aut 
etiam optanda, si aliquo eum deducit, ubi sit futurus aeternus; atqui tertium certe nihil 
inveniri potest; Tusc. 1.118 non enim temere nec fortuito sati et creati sumus, sed profecto 
fuit quaedam vis, quae generi consuleret humano nec id gigneret aut aleret, quod cum exan-
clavisset omnes labores, tum incideret in mortis malum sempiternum: portum potius paratum 
nobis et perfugium putemus. 
34 C. Vitelli, M. Tulli Ciceronis Consolationis Fragmenta, Milano-Roma 1979. 
35 Cic. consol. F 22 Vitelli nec omnibus - inquit - idem illi sapientes arbitrati sunt eundem 
cursum in caelum patere. Nam vitiis et sceleribus contaminatos deprimi in tenebras atque in 
caeno iacere docuerunt, castos autem animos, puros integros incorruptos, bonis etiam studiis 
atque artibus expolitos leni quodam et facili lapsu ad deos id est ad originem suam 
pervolare. Cicero also admits a punishment after death at Hortens. F 114 Grilli at illi qui 
Tullius quasi consulares philosophos appellat, quod eorum magni pendat auctoritatem..., non 
extingui animam sed emigrare censent et, ut merita quoque eius adserunt seu bona seu mala, 
vel ad beatitudinem vel ad miseriam permanere. However, the Hortensius ended with a state-
ment of the Socratic alternative (F 115 Grilli). 
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detached from their ideological background and made them subservient to 
rhetorical effectiveness. Cicero’s Consolatio is a clear illustration of this 
rhetorical attitude, though it is about 300 years older than the handbooks of 
Menander and Ps. Dionysius.  
When Cicero, in the Hortensius, connects the idea of life in this world as 
a punishment for the soul with a fault committed in a previous existence36, 
this obviously entails the doctrine of reincarnation, and the ideological 
framework of this passage soundly agrees with the consistent picture we find 
in Plato’s Phaedon, where the soul is immortal and atones for faults com-
mitted during its incarnation with a following reincarnation, and only the 
very best and the very worst receive eternal rewards or punishments. On the 
contrary, neither in Cicero’s Consolatio nor (with one exception) in other 
extant consolations, nor of course in the rhetorical outlines of Menander and 
Ps. Dionysius do we find any trace of reincarnation. The two rhetoricians, 
who have no interest for anything but rhetorical effectiveness, consider only 
eternal bliss for the soul of the departed; Cicero completes the picture by 
adding eternal punishments. But this is at odds with his previous statement 
that life in this world is a punishment for the soul. If there is no reincar-
nation and the retribution of sins is eternal punishment after death, how can 
life in this world be called a punishment too? Doing away with reincarnation 
leads not only Cicero, but almost all the writers of consolations into a 
philosophical impasse.  
This of course did not concern the writers of rhetorical handbooks, bent 
only on rhetorical effectiveness, nor the writers of consolations themselves, 
who could hardly ignore the institutional goal of such writings, namely the 
soothing of the survivors and the celebration of the dead person. To do this 
they had to make a careful selection within the philosophical doctrines con-
cerning the immortality of the soul, leaving aside anything that did not agree 
with the goal of such writings. If life on earth is a reincarnation, and this in 
turn is the punishment of sins committed in a previous life, this would mean 
attributing such sins to the departed, since he was born in this world. But 
this would offend, rather than soothe, his surviving relatives. For this reason, 
as we have seen, the idea of life as a punishment was given the simple 
function of developing the topos of the disparaging of life meant to diminish 
the grief caused by the death of the loved one. But of course this caused an 
utter philosophical inconsistency, which perhaps was avoided by Crantor, if 
he, after calling life a punishment for the soul, left the issue of its survival 
after death in the background. 
In no extant consolation do we find any hint at reincarnation at all – with 
 
36 Cic. Hortens. F 112 Grilli (above, note 27).  
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one exception: a consolatory writing that we have already mentioned as un-
usual, namely the consolation to his wife by Plutarch, for the loss of their 
little daughter. In this work Plutarch is bent not so much on rhetorical effec-
tiveness as on stressing the faith in immortality advocated by the mysteric 
cult of Dionysus he adhered to. It is no chance that Plutarch speaks of an 
unending series of reincarnations as a punishment for souls who have pol-
luted themselves by a sinful life37 immediately after proclaiming his 
Dionysiac faith. Their little daughter, however, will be spared this punish-
ment, because she has died so young and had no time to stain her soul. This 
is the only consolation where the idea of life as a punishment appears in a 
consistent doctrinal framework.  
The idea that those who die young do not have the time to commit sins is 
found also in Seneca’s Consolatio ad Marciam38; but in Seneca there is no 
reincarnation and the eschatological picture is different. Though Seneca 
does not believe in the immortality of the soul, as I have shown elsewhere39, 
he too follows the rules of the rhetorical handbooks, which recommend to 
present it as a certainty, but he does so in a more subreptitious way than 
Cicero. The great eschatological description which closes the Consolatio ad 
Marciam is presented at first as Marcia’s imagination: puta itaque etc.40 (“so 
imagine etc.”). Then, in the very last line of the work, it suddenly appears to 
be reality: felicem filium tuum, Marcia, qui ista iam novit! 41 (“How happy is 
your son, Marcia, who already experiences such a bliss!”).  
In the very last fragment of Cicero’s Consolatio42 we find the statement 
of a veritable intended deification of his dead daughter. Again, this is only 
the development of another rhetorical topos suggested in Menander’s outline. 
Both the comparison of the departed one with mythological deified characters 
and his or her consecration by the survivors, which appear in Cicero’s frag-
 
 
37 Plut. consol. ad uxor. 10, 611DE. 
38 Sen. ad Marc. 23.1 facillimum ad superos iter est animis cito ab humana conversatione 
dimissis; minimum enim faecis, ponderis traxerunt.  
39 Setaioli, Seneca e l’oltretomba. 
40 Sen. ad Marc. 26.1. 
41 Sen. ad Marc. 26.7. 
42 Cic. consol. F 23 Vitelli cum vero – inquit – et mares et feminas compluris ex 
hominibus in deorum numero esse videamus et eorum in urbibus atque agris augustissima 
delubra veneremur, adsentiamur eorum sapientiae quorum ingeniis et inventis omnem vitam 
legibus et institutis excultam constitutamque habemus. Quod si ullum umquam animal 
consecrandum fuit, illud profecto fuit. Si Cadmi progenies aut Amphionis aut Tyndari in 
caelum tollenda fama fuit, huic idem honos certe dicandus est. Quod quidem faciam teque 
omnium optimam doctissimam adprobantibus dis immortalibus ipsis in eorum coetum 
locatam ad opinionem omnium mortalium consecrabo.  
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ment, closely resemble Menander’s final recommendations in his treatment 
of consolatory speech43. On the one hand, immortality is here asserted on the 
ground of old legends; on the other it is considered to be a benefit that 
survivors can bestow on the dead through their love. We are a long way 
even from the pretense of sound philosophical reasoning. We can safely as-
sume, therefore, that Cicero’s work ended with a purely rhetorical flourish, 
which punctually confirms the instructions of rhetorical handbooks to 
would-be writers of consolatory works. 
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43 Men. rhet. III, p. 414.23-27 ou{tw kai; th;n  JElevnhn, ou{tw kai; tou;" Dioskouvrou" kai; 
to;n  JHrakleva levgousi sumpoliteuvesqai meta; tw`n qew`n: uJmnw`men ou\n aujto;n wJ" h{rwa, 
ma`llon de; wJ" qeo;n aujto;n makarivswmen, eijkovna" gravywmen, iJlaskwvmeqa wJ" daivmona. 
